Abstract-The Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) is a measure of both confusion and diffusion, which are key properties of a cryptographic hash function. This work provides a working definition of the SAC, describes an experimental methodology that can be used to statistically evaluate whether a cryptographic hash meets the SAC, and uses this to investigate the degree to which compression function of the SHA-l hash meets the SAC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many computer scientists know little about the inner work ings of cryptographic hashes, though they may know some thing about their properties. One of these properties is the "avalanche effect", by analogy with the idea of a small stone causing a large avalanche of changes. The "avalanche effect" explains how a small change in the input data can result in a large change in the output hash. However, many questions around the effect are unanswered. For example, how large is the effect? After how many "rounds" of a compression function can it be seen? Do all inputs result in such an effect? Little experimental work has been done to answer these questions for any hash function, and this paper contributes experimental results that help in this regard.
A boolean n-bit hash function H is the transform Zfl" -+ Z�, where m is an arbitrary non-negative number. A crypto graphic hash function attempts to obscure the relationship be tween the input and output of H, and the degree to which this is accomplished is directly related to the (second-)preimage resistance of the hash function. This implies that two similar inputs should have very different outputs.
The Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) ( [ 1] , [2] ) formalizes this notion by measuring the amount of change introduced in the output by a small change in the input. It builds on the definition of completeness, which means that each bit of the output depends on all the bits of the input, in a way that is cryptographically relevant. Using the definition of H as above, an output H (x) = Y is obtained for an input x. The initial bit of x is now flipped, giving H(xo) = Yo. This process is repeated for X l .. n , resulting in Y l .. n ' The SAC is met when the Hamming distance between Y and YO .. n is, on average, �.
There are three contributions that this paper makes to the existing body of research: Section 4 presents experimental results, and some discussion follows.
II. RELATED WORK
The original definition [1] of the SAC is:
Consider X and Xi, two n-bit, binary plaintext vectors, such that X and Xi differ only in bit i, 1 < i < n. Let where Y = f( X ) , Yi = f( Xi ) and f is the cryptographic transformation, under consideration.
If f is to meet the strict avalanche criterion, the probability that each bit in Vi is equal to 1 should be one half over the set of all possible plaintext vectors X and Xi. This should be true for all values of i.
Forn� [2] expresses this as:
Let ;!2 and ;!2i denote two n-bit vectors, such that ;!2 and ;!2i differ only in bit i, 1 :s; i :s; n. zg denotes the n-dimensional vector space over 0,1.
The function f(;!2) = z, z E {O, I} fulfills the SAC if and only if L f(l;.)tBf(;!2i) = 2 n -l , for all i with 1 :s; i :s; n. Other works ( [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] ) follow in the same vein. 
The simplest function of this nature is !(J2) = xOl\xI' Note that the sum of each of the third and fourth columns is 2 n -l , as predicted, and that this function fulfills the summed definition of the SAC However, the first and last rows do not fulfill the original definition of the SAC at all: the probability of change, given the baseline values 00 and 11, is 0.0 in each case. It is therefore more reasonable to regard the row probability as important. This understanding is also in accordance with the original text that defined the term. Under this definition, Xo 1\ X l is not SAC-compliant.
It is worth noting that the original definition, as per Webster
& Ta vares [1] , is slightly ambiguous. They state that "the probability that each bit in V; is equal to 1 should be one half over the set of all possible plaintext vectors X and X/'; however, they also state that "to satisfy the strict avalanche criterion, every element must have a value close to one half"
978-1-5090-2473-5/16/$31.00 ©2016 IEEE (emphasis mine). Under Lloyd's interpretation, the SAC is only satisfied when an element changes with a probability of precisely 0.5. This is an unnecessarily binary criterion, as it seems to be more useful (and more in line with the original definition) to understand how far a particular sample diverges from the SAC Therefore, this paper regards the SAC as a continuum but takes Lloyd's formulation as the definition of what it means to "meet" the SAC Preneel [4] suggests a generalisation of the SAC called the propagation criterion (PC), defined as Let! be a Boolean function of n variables. Then ! satisfies the propagation criterion of degree k,
changes with a probability of 112 whenever i (1
are complemented.
It can be seen that the SAC is equivalent to PC(l). The same work defines an extended propagation criterion which regards the SAC as a continuum. Much of the subsequent work ([S], [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [l3]) in this area has more closely examined the relationship between PC and nonlinearity characteristics. Many of these extend the PC in interesting ways and examine ways of constructing functions which satisfy PC (n), but experimental research that targets existing algorithms is scarce.
Although there are proven theoretical ways to construct a function which satisfies the SAC [7] , there is no way (apart from exhaustive testing) to verify that an existing function satisfies the SAC By contrast, useful cryptographic properties such as non-degeneracy [14] or bentness [15] are verifiable without having to resort to exhaustive testing. However, the SAC metric is no worse in this regard than the correlation immunity [16] and balance [17] metrics which also require exhaustive testing.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The SHA-l hash [IS] is a well-known cryptographic hash function which generates a 160-bit hash value. It is the successor to the equally well-known MD5 cryptographic hash function which generated a 12S-bit hash value. SHA-l was designed by the National Security Agency of the United
States of America and published in 1995 as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Federal Information
Processing Standard ISO-I.
A. Hash details
The SHA-l hash is constructed using the Merkle-Damgard paradigm ( [19] , [20] ), which means that it consists of padding, chunking, and compression stages. These stages are necessary for the hash algorithm to be able to handle inputs which are greater than 447 bits in length; however, they are unnecessary to consider in an examination of the compression function itself, since the strength of the Merkle-Damgard paradigm is predicated on the characteristics of the compression function.
This paper examines only the compression function itself, and does not concern itself with padding, chunking, or Davies
Meyer strengthening [21] .
The SHA-l compression function makes use of addition, rotation, and logical functions (AND, OR, NOT, XOR), ap plied over the course of 80 rounds, to convert the 16 input words into a 5-word (l60-bit) output. Each round affects the calculation of subsequent rounds, and the hashing process can therefore not be parallelized to any significant degree. A full description of the inner workings of SHA-l is provided in FIPS 180-1 [18] . For the purposes of this work, it is sufficient to understand that each round generates a value that is used in subsequent rounds, and that there are 80 rounds in total.
B. Statistical approach
It is computationally infeasible to exhaustively test the degree to which SHA-l meets the SAC since the input space it is sufficient to assert that there are no values which cannot be generated as intermediate intitialization vectors (given a pool of � 264 different bitstreams). Therefore, we can take independent 672-byte inputs as our population of concern. The hypothesis to be tested is that SHA-l meets the SAC. The desired margin of error is 1 %, at a 99% confidence level.
The required sample size is therefore determined by Given the 264 input space, this seems to be a very small number; however, "it is the absolute size of the sample I https:llwww.random.org 2https:llwww.fourmilab.ch!hotbits/ 978-1-5090-2473-5/16/$3l.00 ©2016 IEEE which determines accuracy, not the size relative to the popula tion" [25] . Data collected during the experiment also indicates the degree to which SHA-l does not meet the SAC, and the round at which the SAC comes into effect. • How quickly do the bits of the SHA-1 hash meet (or not meet) the SAC?
For repeatability, it is disclosed that the data used to create inputs is the first 16587 x 672 = 11,146,464 bits generated by random.org from the 2n d to the 12 th of January 2015. This data is available from https://www.random.org/files/.
IV. RESULTS
As shown by Figure 1 , the SHA-l hash diverges from the SAC by remarkably small amounts. The initial divergence is due entirely to the fact that the very last bits of a 672-bit input are found in rounds 15 and 16 and, when modified, have an exaggerated effect on subsequent rounds. This effect is largely due to the fact that the changes have not yet had time to diffuse through the rounds. Data which is most representative of the final hash output can therefore be seen in rounds 2: 24.
If sufficient time is provided for diffusion, a different picture emerges. Figure 2 shows the absolute divergence from round 24 onwards. Although the heatmap looks noisier, the most important thing to note is that the maximum divergence from the "ideal" SAC value of 0.5 is only 0.0009, which is within the margin of error for this sample size. Figure 3 , and there are few surprises here. It has a median, mean, and mode of 0.5, and appears to be a normal distribution. To verify whether the distribution is, in fact, normal, a quantile-quantile plot was generated. A quantile quantile plot overlays points from a data-set on top of the theoretically-predicted distribution; if the actual points lie along the theoretically-predicted line, then the data fits the specified distribution.
Three possible distributions were plotted (see Figure 4 ):
• Normal (0" = 0.019285397, f..l = 0.5), using the standard deviation and mean of the data where round ?: 24.
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• Log-normal (0" = 0.059899039, f..l = 0.49855239), estimated from the data .
• Weibull (k = 9.6116811, A = 0.52480750), estimated from the data.
None of the distributions match the data exactly; in fact, the normal distribution is the worst fit, with log-normal and
Weibull distributions being much closer fits. At present, the distribution that the data conforms to is unknown. to be distributed into more buckets as they tend towards zero, and conversely concentrated into fewer buckets as they tend towards l. This tendency is present throughout the rounds.
The z-axis curve in the middle of the bits, which appears to be too pronounced to be an artifact of averaging, would seem to indicate that there are more non-zero buckets that are being filled as the bit-value increases. However, such an increase This makes it extraordinarily difficult to determine which input bit could contribute to a particular output change, since the answer is likely to be "any of them"! The methodology that has been described above is not specific to the SHA-l hash, and may be applied to any hash has also proven to be resistant to preimage attacks; could the reason be that it shares a similarly rapid achievement of c\ose to-SAC bits, followed by a similarly "stable" maintenance of the SAC through all of its rounds?
On an implementation note, it may be worthwhile to use a cloud computing platform (such as Google's BigTable)
for future experiments of this nature. The experiments have generated tens of gigabytes of data which take some time to query on a single machine. The scalable infrastructure of the cloud may allow queries, and hence experiments, to proceed more quickly.
